Protecting the consumer is one of the principal objectives of financial regulation. One of the main ways by which regulators seek to achieve that protection is by deterring harmful conduct by firms. In this essay, Peter Cartwright examines deterrence in theory and practice, assessing the FCA's championing of "credible deterrence", and considering the extent to which such an approach is, and should be, used by the regulator.
4 risks'. 15 These are akin to the rational cost benefit calculators envisaged by Gobert and Punch. For these firms in particular, it could be argued that regulators should focus on pursuing deterrence.
Characterisation of firms as falling within a particular category can therefore inform regulators' responses to their conduct. An amoral calculator will in theory be deterred from breaking the law if a cost-benefit analysis suggests that it is better to comply than to contravene. To use a simplified model, it will comply with the law where pD>U. This is where p is the perceived likelihood of having the contravention identified and a penalty imposed, D is the perceived level of detriment that results from the contravention, and U is the perceived benefit from contravention. 16 On this basis, the principal factors that deter contravention are the probability of enforcement action (as perceived by the firm) and the level of detriment that it perceives will result. From the perspective of a regulator, it is far cheaper for the level of penalty (which forms part of D) to be raised than for the intensity of enforcement action (which forms part of p) to be raised.
Whether the regulator has similar control over these variables will depend on a range of factors. For example, where the criminal law is concerned, any penalty will be imposed by the criminal courts rather than the regulator itself and so largely beyond the latter's control.
Deterrence strategies might be championed on the assumption that (some) firms will engage in a cost benefit analysis of whether to contravene or comply. By demonstrating a willingness to take formal action, for example through the imposition of penalties, the regulator is making a clear statement to the firm in question, as well as to others, that it will not tolerate contravention. It is clear that there is strong support at the FCA for focusing on deterrence.
Credible Deterrence and Enforcement at the FCA
The FCA sees what it calls 'credible deterrence' as a central element in its approach to 
Financial Penalties and the FCA
As is made clear in the extract above, FCA has a range of powers that might deter misconduct. They include prohibitions and public censure as well as the financial penalties that are the principal focus of this piece. In exercising its power to issue a financial penalty, the FCA must have regard to the relevant provisions in the FCA Handbook, and to guidance published in the Handbook and set out in the Regulatory Guides, in particular DEPP. DEPP provides that the principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty is to:
'promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar breaches, and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant behaviour.'
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It is clear, therefore, that the FCA sees the imposition of a financial penalty as central to achieving its policy of credible deterrence. However, it is also possible to identify significant concerns with the use of financial penalties to achieve such deterrence, both in theory and in practice. These are now considered. 
Part Two: Some Concerns with Credible Deterrence in Theory and

Practice
Credible deterrence lies at the heart of the FCA's enforcement strategy. It is perhaps understandable that regulators should wish to project an image of themselves as fearless enforcers. This is particularly the case for those organisations that have been criticised for alleged laxity of supervision and enforcement. The FSA, for example, was avowedly 'light touch' but was claimed by some critics to be 'soft touch'. 22 Against the background of a global financial crisis and widespread concern about financial misconduct, it is to be expected that a financial regulator would wish to demonstrate its authority. It is also clear that the Regulator accepts the essential premise of deterrence outlined above. In the words of Tracey McDermott 'To achieve credible deterrence, wrongdoers must not only realise that they face a real and tangible risk of being held to account, but must also expect to face a meaningful sanctions.' 23 However, this focus on credible deterrence raises a number of significant concerns.
Types of Firm and (Dis)Proportionality
While theories of optimal deterrence are based primarily on a vision of firms as amoral calculators, many firms will not adopt a cost-benefit analysis of the type envisaged.
Firms comply with the law for a host of reasons other than the fear of receiving a sanction. These reasons include a sense of duty and habit, and also a respect for the rule of law. 24 Ayres and Braithwaite have commented that a majority of firms will comply with the law most of the time 'because it is the law.' 25 The reluctance of many regulators to take enforcement action as a matter of course is based in part on the assumption that most firms are motivated to comply and that most contraventions are not calculated.
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The optimal deterrence model outlined above is therefore of limited utility where a firm is not inclined deliberately to flout the law. In practice, many contraventions occur where firms act without due skill and care rather than on the basis of conscious decisionmaking, and it is arguably difficult to deter negligence. Many breaches of FSMA occur where firms lack inadequate controls, supervision and organisation rather than where they display wilful misconduct. The second objection to a focus on deterrence for firms who lack the intent to contravene is that such a focus is simply unfair, regardless of any impact it might have.
There is a danger of penalties being formally imposed which do not reflect the culpability of the firm. Even where the formal sanction is a financial penalty, part of the 'sting' of the sanction may be the negative publicity that results from its imposition. The danger of disproportionality is particularly apparent in such circumstances, given that the impact of adverse publicity is determined not formally by the regulator or the courts, but instead by what has been described as the 'capricious jury of public opinion'. 32 Where the consequences of particular enforcement action are excessive, that action will presumably (and perhaps inevitably) be disproportionate. Some commentators have argued that while regulators should take account of proportionality: 'the most that is required to satisfy the principle of proportionality is formal proportionate quantification of sentence in advance, irrespective of the degree of impact upon an offender.' 33 This seems questionable. If it is anticipated by the regulator that particular action is likely to have a disproportionate impact on a particular firm, it seems difficult to argue that the enforcer has met its duty to act in a proportionate manner.
Effectiveness of Deterrence where firms are amoral calculators
A second concern is that, to the extent that there are rational firms adopting a costbenefit analysis, it is doubtful that such firms will be deterred by the actions of regulators, whether that action be prosecution and the subsequent imposition of a (criminal) fine, or the imposition of a (civil) financial penalty. Most of the research in this area focuses on the use of the criminal rather than civil law. Some such research has emphasised that the likelihood of firms' being pursued and penalised is very small. 35 Not only is the probability of apprehension and formal action such as prosecution low, but it is also likely that firms realise this to be the case.
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As a result, the value of p is likely to be low. By the same token, where penalties are imposed, the level of those penalties is typically low (and probably realised to be so). For example, Macrory quotes the average fine imposed for prosecutions brought by the Environment Agency in 2005 as being just over £5000. 37 In its major report Changing
Banking for Good the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards argued that
where the FSA's actions against banks were concerned 'the credibility of enforcement has been damaged by a legacy of fines that were pitiful compared to the benefits banks gained from the misconduct'. 38 While D does not consist only of the level of formal penalty but also other forms of detriment (such as the inconvenience of dealing with enforcement action, any negative publicity arising from such action and so on) it is doubtful that this will be perceived as sufficiently significant to amount to a credible deterrent. On this basis a rational firm may conclude that the benefits of contravention (U) outweigh the costs. The need to ensure that penalties are sufficient to deter is considered below.
It could be argued that where criminal (rather than civil) financial penalties are concerned there is an added weight to the penalty because of the stigma attached to the criminal label. Indeed, it has been suggested that business people 'abhor' the label of criminality. 39 But this can be over-stated. First, regulatory offences will often be treated as 'not criminal in any real sense', both by defendants and by the public. 40 This implies that even where members of the public (for example, consumers) realise that an offence has been committed, they do not attribute significant stigma to the wrongdoer. Second, it is doubtful that the public in practice distinguishes between whether the penalty was criminal or civil. The word 'penalty' is neutral in this regard and even 'fine' can be used to encompass criminal and civil financial penalties. Whether a criminal penalty is more likely than a civil sanction to be given publicity (for example by the regulator) is unclear.
The issue of proportionality is also relevant where amoral calculators are concerned.
There may be an argument for imposing a penalty whenever there is intentional wrongdoing. However, for that penalty credibly to deter the amoral calculator, it might have to be so high that it seems disproportionate to the wrongdoing. Indeed, there is a danger of what has been labelled the 'deterrence trap' where to be an effective deterrent, a penalty may be so high as to put a firm out of business, a result which will frequently not be justified. 41 The balance between providing a penalty that is likely to deter, and ensuring that any such penalty is not disproportionate to the wrongdoing, is frequently difficult to find.
A further point to consider is that where the process involved does not involve all the safeguards associated with a criminal trial, it may be more likely that mistakes are made. 42 Despite the undoubted safeguards provided in the area of financial services, this remains a concern.
Consequentialism
Finally, the focus on deterrence suggests that imposing penalties is primarily consequentialist. 43 The FCA appears to assume that positive consequences can be achieved by imposing penalties and that this justifies their imposition. This is illustrated, at least to some extent, by some of the principles which underpin the FCA's approach to its enforcement powers. In particular, principle four states that:
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'The FCA will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its action, to deter future non-compliance by others, to eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance, and where appropriate, to remedy the harm caused by non-compliance.'
This wording may be familiar to some readers. 43 The term 'consequentialist' is used quite loosely here to reflect an approach which aims primarily to achieve a particular objective such as a change in behaviour. 44 FCA Enforcement Guide op. cit para 2.2. 45 Macrory op. cit. 46 FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit.
censure and that they should be based, at least in part, on the idea of deserts. This may be particularly true of penalties imposed under the criminal law, but might also be true of other penalties. While DEPP does make reference to matters that might be described as non-consequentialist or retributive, the focus and balance appears consequentialist, and the tone of credible deterrence certainly is. 47 The more serious the wrongdoing, the more important it is that sanctions reflect that seriousness, regardless of (or perhaps in addition to) any aim of achieving deterrence. 48 Seriousness is made up of two principal elements: the extent and/or type of harm, and the degree of culpability. 49 A sanctioning regime, be it criminal or civil, needs to be willing to impose penalties that reflect that seriousness, even in circumstances where it cannot be assumed it will change conduct in the future.
Part Three: Addressing the Concerns
This section looks at how we might address the concerns raised by a focus on credible deterrence. It considers how deterrence might be made more effective; how different types of firm might be treated; how proportionality can be achieved, and how sanctioning needs to reflect concepts that might be described as non-consequentialist. It will become clear that in practice, the FCA does look beyond credible deterrence and address a number of these issues, despite its apparent focus on the concept.
Effectiveness
The first issue to consider is the concern that deterrence is unlikely to be effective (and therefore credible) even for amoral calculators. This might be addressed in a number of ways.
Increasing the Value of p
First, for deterrence strategies to work firms must believe that there is a realistic prospect of their being pursued, investigated and sanctioned for wrongdoing. To a large extent this depends in the approach the regulator takes to supervision and, in particular, to trying to identify breaches. The FCA's approach is risk-based, and resources are 47 See below. 48 Retributive theories which focus on punishment as a morally appropriate response to wrongdoing incorporate the need for punishment to be consequentialist in the sense of also deterring crime. See A Ashworth 'Sentencing' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R Reiner The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2 nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 1096-1097. 49 Culpability will typically be concerned with mens rea but will sometimes be broadened to include attitude and motivation. See for example the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. deployed on the basis of perceived threats to its regulatory objectives. In relation to its overall approach to supervision, the FCA states: 50 'The FCA will adopt a pre-emptive approach which will be based on making forward-looking judgments about firms' business models, product strategy and how they run their businesses, to enable the FCA to identify and intervene earlier to prevent problems crystallising.'
In addition, the FCA has stated that its supervision model is inter alia: 'forward looking and more interventionist…consumer-centric…robust when things go wrong… [and] viewing poor behaviour in all markets through the lens of impact on consumers.' 51 This suggests a qualitatively different attitude to supervision from that taken by its predecessor. Coupled with the focus the FCA has said it places on firms (and sectors) that could cause, or are causing, harm to consumers or that threaten market integrity, it is plausible to argue that in future firms will believe it more likely that wrongdoing will be identified and responded to. There is strong support for a greater focus on enforcement action in Changing Banking for Good. The Report argues that:
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'Greater priority needs to be placed on the role of enforcement, with adequate resources devoted to this function and leadership with a willingness to pursue even the difficult cases, often involving the larger and more powerful players, in order to build up a credible deterrent effect.'
In terms of whether the response of the FCA involves a financial penalty, the factors that the organisation will consider when deciding whether to take action for a financial penalty are set out in DEPP, although the FCA recognizes that the list is not exhaustive and that some will not be applicable in specific cases. 53 The factors are: the nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach; the conduct of the person after the breach; the previous disciplinary record and compliance history of the person; FCA guidance and other published materials; action taken by the FSA or FCA in previous similar cases; and action taken by other domestic or international regulatory authorities. 54 This demonstrates that a decision to impose a penalty is a matter of judgement to be taken on the basis of a range of criteria. As will be seen later, it also calls into doubt the centrality of deterrence to decision making. it seems unlikely that well-informed firms will consider it more likely that they will face action unless there is in fact an increase.
Increasing the Value of D
Second, for deterrence to be credible there is a need to demonstrate that where contravention is established, meaningful detriment is likely to follow. The most obvious component of D is the penalty imposed as a result of contravention.
DEPP sets out some of the factors to be taken into account when determining the level of penalty that is appropriate and proportionate to the misconduct. The regime for penaltysetting is based upon three principles: disgorgement; discipline and deterrence.
Disgorgement means that a firm (or individual) should not benefit from the breach, discipline means that they should be penalised for any wrongdoing, and deterrence means that any penalty imposed 'should deter the firm or individual who committed the breach, and others, from committing further or similar breaches.'
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It is difficult to assess whether the penalties imposed upon firms are sufficient to contribute towards credible deterrence. previous warnings about the use of poorly managed incentive schemes and the firms' previous disciplinary record. 66 
Refocusing D
Discussion of deterrence strategies frequently takes place in the context of wrongdoing by firms and most of the discussion above has assumed that the recipient of a financial penalty will be a firm. It is notable that the FSA began to focus greater attention on individuals and the FCA has taken this forward. In 2013-13, the FSA took more actions against individuals than against firms, imposing over £5 million in fines.
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This attention on individual liability is extremely important. Action against individuals will sometimes be more appropriate than that against firms. While recognizing that the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with a firm's regulatory obligations is that of the firm, DEPP states that the FCA may take disciplinary action against an 'approved person' where there is evidence of personal culpability on his or her part. It continues by saying that 'Personal culpability arises where the behaviour was deliberate or where the approved person's standard of behaviour was below that which would be reasonable in all the circumstances at the time of the conduct concerned.'
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There has been increasing emphasis on the role of personal liability as a deterrent against wrongdoing by firms. 69 There is concern that a focus on the firm as a legal person raises particular difficulties. First, it is sometimes difficult to attach culpability to a business. This is particularly so where the criminal law is concerned, because of the nature of corporate criminal liability (where it is notoriously difficult to attach liability for offences requiring proof of mens rea, and may also be problematic where strict liability offences are accompanied by defences of due diligence). 70 Fault (broadly understood) may exist within companies in different ways and at different levels. This has been starkly revealed where the criminal law is invoked against often large and complex firms.
Attempts have been made to capture wrongdoing for the purposes of attributing fault, but it remains difficult. 71 Second, as noted above, it is questionable whether a financial penalty against a firm is likely to have the same deterrent effect as a penalty against an individual. The former may be treated as little more than a business expense, whereas (depending on the precise penalty) the latter may lead not only to the individual losing his or her livelihood, but potentially their freedom where the criminal law is invoked.
Where penalties are administrative rather than criminal, incarceration is not an issue, but loss of livelihood remains so.
The FCA recognises that individuals will sometimes need to be targeted by a policy based on deterrence. In particular, the FCA has announced its determination to pursue senior managers who, in its words, fail to: 'recognise and manage the risk that their firm is running; control the way their products are sold; [and] Furthermore, the FSA has well-developed sanctions that take advantage of the power of negative publicity. As well as being able to impose financial penalties (which may themselves generate publicity) the FSA is able to impose public censure as an alternative to such penalties. 82 The FSA's Guidance sets out the factors to be considered when deciding whether to impose public censure rather than a financial penalty. For example, the first factor is whether deterrence can be achieved effectively through a public censure. A second factor is whether the person has profited from, or avoided a loss from, the breach. A third factor is seriousness, with financial penalties (generally) being used in more serious cases. Fourth is that where the breach has been brought to the attention of the FSA by the person in question, it may make public censure more appropriate. Fifth, where the person admits the breach, fully co-operates with the FSA and takes steps to ensure that those who lose out receive compensation, again this may weigh in favour of merely public censure. Sixth, a poor disciplinary/compliance record is likely to point in favour of a financial penalty. The rationale for this is stated to be deterrence. Seventh, the FSA will look to ensure consistency in its approach, by considering previous cases. Finally, the FSA will consider the impact upon the person concerned. The factors reveal that public censure alone will typically be used in less serious cases, which may appear surprising given that negative publicity will in some cases provide a more compelling deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty.
83
It should also be noted that negative publicity can arise without the imposition of a sanction, but merely through the conveying of negative information. This is particularly apparent in the area of the publication of complaints data. The FCA requires firms to publish certain details and then publishes aggregate and firm-level data. 84 The Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS) also publishes data about the complaints with which it deals.
While these would not, typically, be described as sanctions, still less penalties, they may have a chastening effect upon firms and therefore be viewed through the lens of deterrence.
From U to D: Removing the Benefits of Contravention
The FCA's penalty-setting regime is based on a number of principles, the first of which is disgorgement. This echoes one of Macrory's 'Penalties Principles' in reflecting the idea that a firm or individual should not benefit from any breach. 85 This is fundamental to the success of a penalties regime in instrumental terms, but also reflects the principle that 82 Public censure includes a statement published under section 205 and a statement of misconduct published under section 66 of FSMA. 83 Cartwright, 'Publicity, punishment and protection' op. cit p. 189. 84 See http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/complaints-data. Accessed 14-1-14. 85 See http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/complaints-data.html Accessed 14-1-14.
no-one should benefit from their wrongdoing. The model of optimal deterrence identifies the benefit from contravention as U. If U can be reduced or eliminated this improves deterrence, as well as potentially providing redress for consumers.
There has been increasing interest in finding more creative ways of achieving this.
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Consumer Redress Schemes are a particularly interesting topic for study in their own right. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider these in detail, but it is interesting to illustrate the role of the FCA in obtaining redress and its relationship with deterrence by referring to a recent development. In late 2013 the FCA reached an agreement with Card Protection Policy Ltd (CPP) and 13 high street banks and credit card issuers to pay redress to up to 7 million consumers who were the victims of misselling. 87 
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It is important for the FCA to ensure that consumer redress is achieved effectively and the power to require firms to establish consumer redress schemes is an important part of that. But such schemes can also be seen from the perspective of deterrence. The threat of being able to impose such a scheme allows the FCA to negotiate solutions with firms.
As seen in other areas, the possession of significant enforcement tools will often allow solutions to be negotiated without the need for formal action. 89 As the CPP example illustrates, it is possible to combine the imposition of a financial penalty with additional measures which have the effect of operating as a financial penalty, but which are characterised instead as redress. Where this occurs, the deterrent effect may be strong.
86 One proposal from Changing Banking for Good (which is not considered in detail here) is that when a fine is imposed on a firm, a significant proportion of the fine should be met from deductions from the remuneration of the bank's staff at the time of the misconduct. The Report argues that this would provide a more direct incentive on individuals to prevent the misconduct. Op. cit para 230. This shows a link between removing benefits and deterrence. 87 The power to require firms to operate a scheme exists under s. The FCA makes the normative case for dealing with contravention without the need for formal discipline or other enforcement action. However, it does say that in such cases:
'the FCA will expect the firm to act promptly in taking the necessary remedial action with its supervisors to deal with the FCA's concerns' and that if the firms does not do this disciplinary or other enforcement action may follow. 93 It may be that the FCA's approach in large part reflects the 'tit for tat' enforcement strategy famously championed by Ayres and Braithwaite. Those authors argue that such an approach is characterised as follows:
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'the regulator refrains from a deterrent response as long as the firm is cooperating; but when the firm yields to the temptation to exploit the co-operative posture of the regulator and cheats on compliance, then the regulator shifts from a cooperative to a deterrent response'.
Tit for tat places great emphasis on the attitude of the firm, something that the FCA recognises is important. Indeed, much has been said recently about culture, both in relation to the regulator and in relation to firms. If culture is, as has been suggested, 'the underpinning that drives the decisions we make and the actions we take' it may be reflected in the attitude of a firm to compliance. 95 Looked at this way, there might be a role for credible deterrence is deterring non-cooperative and incentivising cooperative behaviour.
A second major point to note is that there may be (some) culpability without intention. A defendant who can demonstrate that despite committing the actus reus of an offence he has all taken reasonable precautions and exercising of all due diligence to avoid the offence will not be convicted. This incentivises firms and individuals to take care to avoid unintentional contravention. 97 This will (a) make commission of the actus reus less likely; and (b) help to ensure that, should it occur, a defence can be made out. Similarly, firms and individuals may face financial penalties for their failure to discharge their duties appropriately on the basis that this will deter such laxity. Credible deterrence may therefore have a role to play even in the absence of intention.
Consequentialist Focus
A final concern with the focus on deterrence is that the importance of nonconsequentialist approaches might be lost. Since the 1960s at least there has been considerable scepticism about the extent to which consequentialist theories such as deterrence (and also rehabilitation) should form the basis for punishment, at least for individuals. 98 While some commentators continue to support such notions, focus has perhaps shifted towards the central role of punishment in reflecting wrongdoing. 'Just deserts' theories of punishment required not only that sentences should be determinate, but that they should be deserved. Wrongdoing is thought to deserve censure because it is wrong, and the censure should reflect that wrong. By focusing on potential results rather than actual wrongs, it could be argued that credible deterrence underplays this important role for sanctions. It should be noted that the FCA's regime does recognise, at least to some extent, the importance of non-consequentialist sanctioning. The second principle of the FSA's penalties regime is discipline -that a firm or individual should be penalised for wrongdoing. It seems though that this may have been been lost in the incessant rhetoric of credible deterrence.
Conclusions
The FCA, like the FSA before it, has placed enormous emphasis on the role that pursuing a policy of credible deterrence can play in ensuring that the objectives of financial regulation are met. There is little doubt that some firms will be deterred from breaking 96 For example, the FSA found that Bank of Scotland had caused significant harm to consumers because of poor mortgage records systems. This led to it fining the firm £4.2 million for its failures. 97 The courts will frequently be influenced by the paper system that the defendant has in place. the law by the threat of sanctions such as financial penalties. However, deterrence may not be as great a driver of compliance as is sometimes assumed. Firms comply with the law for a host of reasons and where breaches occur, many are unintentional. Those firms which might be described as amoral calculators can be deterred in theory, but there are doubts as to how effectively they are deterred in practice. As in other sectors, formal enforcement action and the imposition of substantial penalties remains relatively unusual. Where such firms are concerned, deterrence might potentially be made more credible in a number of ways, including increasing the detriment that firms feel, increasing the probability of enforcement action, re-focusing the target of the enforcement action and removing the benefits from contravention. But improving deterrence in these ways may lead to claims of disproportionality on the part of the regulated. This, in turn, may sometimes reduce the effectiveness of regulation. It is important that regulators are responsive in their enforcement strategies, and where they do this, regulatory objectives are most likely to be met. The constraints that are placed upon the FCA's enforcement powers go some way towards ensuring that such responsiveness is embedded. This may mean that the rhetoric of credible deterrence is over-stated, but is a price worth paying.
